

Memories of Hiroshima and Narratives of the Nation State

By Akiko Naono

Hiroshima evokes various memories in the minds of people across the globe. It is remembered by some as one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. Such remembrance embraces "the spirit of Hiroshima," an unwavering hope for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of lasting world peace. On the other hand, Hiroshima reminds others of Japanese aggression in the Asia-Pacific during World War II, notably the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Nanjing Massacre. In fact, many Americans justify the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by saying they hastened the end of the war, saving thousands of lives as a result. In addition, many Asians and Pacific islanders who lived under Japanese colonial rule often say the atomic bombs liberated them from Japanese aggression. The conflict surrounding remembrances of Hiroshima is partly generated by the hegemony of national narratives in shaping public memories of the bombing. In other words, Hiroshima memories are produced largely as narratives of the nation state, which divide the agents of remembrance into national subjects, and in turn create antagonism among them. Given that antagonism exists in the practice of remembrance, how can we create a more hospitable memory of Hiroshima?

Public memory is produced in the fields of power, such as the media and popular culture, through political, social, and cultural battles over how to remember past events. The public memory of the atomic bombing in Japan has been produced largely as Japanese national narratives since 1954, when a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to radiation fallout near the Bikini Atoll, where the United States tested a hydrogen bomb. Many Japanese saw the incident as the third tragedy involving nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such a perception helped nationalize memories of the atomic bombing. The most emblematic of the nationalization of atomic bomb memories is the phrase, "Japan is the only nation to have suffered the catastrophe of an atomic bombing." These national narratives assign the atomic bomb victims the subject-position of "the Japanese" through remembering the bombing as a Japanese tragedy. This in turn subjugates (colonial) memories of non-Japanese atomic bomb survivors and victims, such as Koreans, in the making of the public memory of the bombing. Put another way, by remembering the atomic bombing as a Japanese tragedy, national narratives remember Japan's former colonial subjects, who were mobilized as "Japanese imperial subjects" during conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, as "non-Japanese," thereby erasing their memories from the public memory of the bombing.

Since the early 1990s, when voices interrogating Japan's war responsibility gained much visibility in discourses on the Asia-Pacific War, the public memory of the bombing in Japan has undergone a fundamental change. Memories of former colonial subjects, such as Korean atomic bomb survivors, became more visible in the field of Hiroshima memory production. A similar shift in the public memory can be identified in the testimonies of Japanese atomic bomb survivors, who refer not only to their victimization, but also to their role during the war as the victimizers of those who suffered from Japanese military aggression. While this change should be welcomed, it could also work to reinforce the hegemony of

national narratives. Many Japanese intellectuals interpret the testimonies of the atomic bomb survivors as "the typical victim consciousness of the Japanese," if these testimonies did not refer to Japan's colonial aggression, and accuse the survivors of being consumed by their own victimization. This kind of interpretation reduces the testimonies of Japanese survivors to national narratives, and in turn reinforces the hegemony of these narratives in the field of public memory production.

While the national narratives remain hegemonic in the public memory of Hiroshima, they cannot completely subsume personal memories of the survivors. Many testimonies written by the survivors describe how they searched for their family members throughout the city in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, and how they cremated the bodies of their loved ones. The survivors mourn the deaths of their loved ones and question why they survived while the people they love died. These affective elements in the testimonies cannot be reduced to national narratives, which attempt to contain memories of the bombing within the boundary of the nation state.

Moreover, there are elements in memories of the survivors that cannot be represented in narrative forms. Many survivors express the unspeakable nature of their experiences: "Only those who experienced the atomic bombing can understand what it was like," is a typical comment. This impossibility of representation may be attributed to the traumatic nature of their experiences. Trauma is an event that cannot be understood fully as it occurs, even to the one who is experiencing it; in other words, trauma is an event inaccessible not only to those on the outside looking in, but also to those who experienced it. Given the nature of trauma, the testimony of a traumatic event cannot become a complete story, nor have narrative closure. This lack of narrative closure can be identified in many of the testimonial accounts of the atomic bomb survivors, especially those that were written during the early post-war period.

In addition, there often appears a loss of signification in the narrative representation of trauma, where there is an unbridgeable chasm between the words that attempt to describe the event and the event itself. One of the primary examples of this loss can be seen in the use of ordinary words to describe an extraordinary act of violence. The use of ordinary words to represent experiences related to the atomic bombing can be identified in the descriptive narratives accompanying the pictures drawn by atomic bomb survivors, which illustrate the immediate aftermath of the dropping of the atomic bomb. For example, some survivors use the phrase "lined up like sardines" to describe the countless dead and injured bodies lying along the river; others describe the dead bodies awaiting cremation as "piled up like daikon radishes." These gaps between the event and the words used to describe it testify to the unrepresentability of the atomic bomb experiences, and challenge us to imagine the realm beyond what is already understood. Yet, are we able to recognize these elements in survivors' narratives that testify to matters beyond the existing framework of intelligibility? Or are we only listening to what their narratives literally convey, reducing them to intelligible narratives, such as "the spirit of Hiroshima" and "the Japanese victim consciousness," without attending to what the loss of signification may signify?

There are those affective elements in the survivors' memories, such as their mourning over the death of their loved ones, which are not reducible to the national narratives of Japan. Moreover, there are those memories held by the survivors that cannot be represented in narrative forms. Yet, survivors' memories are often subsumed under the narratives of the nation state in the battles over the making of the public memory surrounding Hiroshima. So long as national narratives remain hegemonic, it is very difficult to produce a more hospitable memory of Hiroshima. To bring this hegemony into crisis, we must produce dissonance in the national narratives of the bombing by bringing the subjugated memories and the affective and unspeakable elements in survivors' testimonies into the public memory of Hiroshima. This dissonance must be articulated to become a counter-hegemonic force in the field of memory production, and ultimately produce a more hospitable memory of Hiroshima.

Naono is a former visiting research fellow at HPI.

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How to Realize Pledges to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

HPI International Symposium on July 29, 2000

By Kazumi Mizumoto

Following the decision at the NPT Review Conference held in New York in April and May 2000 to commit itself to an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) held an international symposium to discuss ways to realize those pledges at the International Conference Center, Hiroshima, on July 29.

The symposium looked at the prospects for a world free of nuclear weapons, and discussed what needs to be done to accomplish the pledges made in New York. The panelists were Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa of the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University; Seiichiro Noboru, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Conference on Disarmament; Hiromichi Umabayashi, president of Peace Depot; Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute; and Cathleen S. Fisher, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.

The symposium was part of the *Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century*, launched by HPI earlier this year. Kurosawa, the project leader, acted as moderator.

Kurosawa opened the symposium with an evaluation of the review conference. Later, Noboru explained the main points of discussion, details of the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and the role played at the

conference by the Japanese government. Umabayashi said that from the point of view of Japanese NGOs, Japan, compared with the New Agenda Coalition, had set its sights too low regarding nuclear disarmament diplomacy. He argued that Japan should maintain its security treaty with the United States, but without a dependence on the latter's nuclear umbrella.

Johnson, who is known for her work with international NGOs, described the conference as a great success, but warned against overstating its positive aspects. She said practical steps needed to be taken before the next NPT Review Conference in 2005. Fisher, who has organized projects on the elimination of nuclear weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center, emphasized the obligation of the United States, the biggest nuclear-weapon state, to overcome its misgivings and promote the elimination of nuclear weapons. At a question-and-answer session, members of the public quizzed Noboru about Japan's diplomatic efforts.

Prior to the symposium, all of the panelists visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, laid flowers at the A-bomb memorial cenotaph, and reiterated their common goal, despite some differences of opinion, of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI.



Practical Measures Must Follow Proposals

Mitsuru Kurosawa

Of the many contentious issues discussed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, three are particularly worthy of note. First, there were conflicts among the five nuclear-weapon states (N-5) over the relationship between national missile defense (NMD) and the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, with Russia, China and France

fiercely opposing the United States' attempts to deploy NMD. The N-5, however, agreed in a joint statement issued at the beginning of the second week that it was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty "as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." This equivocal wording allows room for wide interpretation, with the United States focusing on "strengthening" the treaty and the other nuclear powers on "preserving" it.

Second, the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" was agreed. Initially, the nuclear-weapon states asserted that they were prepared to give an unequivocal undertaking only to achieve the "ultimate goals of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament," but the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) insisted on an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Following a compromise, a treaty on general and complete disarmament was covered by a different paragraph, and the phrase "engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and...take steps leading to nuclear disarmament within five years," which the NAC had demanded, was removed from the final document. We should often remind the nuclear-weapon states of the undertaking and take practical steps immediately, challenging though that will be.

Third, there was little substance to "practical steps" for nuclear disarmament in the future, because of the reluctance of nuclear-weapon states to be innovative, and a regression in the final document from the chairman's working paper. The positive atmosphere for nuclear disarmament was not created due to confrontation among the nuclear-weapon states over the NMD and the ABM. Moreover, China was reluctant to facilitate disarmament, and opposed the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), its moratorium, increased transparency and de-alerting status. Russia also tried to impose a condition of preserving strategic stability on some of the nuclear disarmament steps.

Practical steps for nuclear disarmament can be analyzed on three different levels. The first concerns multilateral issues. The final document includes multilateral issues, such as the early entry into force of the CTBT, a moratorium on nuclear tests until then, the start of FMCT negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the establishment of a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament at the CD.

The second level concerns bilateral issues. The final document calls for the early entry into force and full implementation of the START II, as well as the conclusion of the START III at the earliest possible date.

The third concerns the measures among the N-5. The following six steps toward nuclear disarmament were agreed: 1. Further efforts for the unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states. 2. Increased

transparency surrounding nuclear weapons capabilities and agreements on nuclear disarmament. 3. The reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 4. The reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. 5. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. 6. The involvement of all nuclear-weapon states in the process toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Kurosawa is a professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.



Japan's Efforts Helped Forge Agreement

Seiichiro Noboru

Trends in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation over the last couple of years have been far from favorable. In addition, a failure by the conference to produce practical results might cause a further deterioration in international relations, casting a shadow over global peace and stability. However, the conference succeeded in

applying the brakes to that negative trend. Still, multilateral negotiations and talks among the N-5 will require a huge effort if commitments made at the conference are to be turned into action.

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) concentrated its efforts on realizing an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," removing the word "ultimate" from that undertaking. In talks with the Japanese delegation, the ambassador of Mexico, an NAC member, said that, given the nuances of the Spanish-language, "ultimate" could mean "never," adding that he would never agree to a document that contained the word.

France and Russia resisted the NAC argument until the very end, and the dispute remained unsettled even after negotiations between the N-5 and the NAC over the weekend. The Mexican ambassador stunned the conference when he said that he regretted the deadlock between the NAC and the N-5, but believed there was no further room for compromise. It looked as if an agreement would elude the conference.

I urged them not to give up so easily because of a diplomatic disagreement over wording, since our decisions may affect the future of mankind. I insisted that all those involved immediately contact their prime ministers or foreign ministers for guidance on making concessions and reaching a compromise. The issue was resolved on the morning of May 18. The agreement, however, is nothing more than a proclamation of the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons; of greater importance is how to achieve that goal.

As the only country to have been the victim of an atomic bombing, Japan presented a practical eight-point proposal with Australia on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, seven of which are reflected in the final document. Japan also helped create the consensus that led to the adoption of the final document, mediating between different groups and bridging the gap between nuclear-weapon states and the NAC. In addition to our role concerning the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of

nuclear arsenals," we provided momentum toward consensus on the morning of the final day, when the conference was on the verge of breaking up over the Middle East. Japan pointed out the serious implications of failure, and read out a message from Foreign Minister Yohei Kono urging conciliation among the participants.

It is necessary to consider what the future holds for the campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons. First, since the signatures and ratifications of 14 more nations are necessary to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT, it is imperative that we strengthen our appeal to these nations, and establish an international monitoring system. Second, Japan has taken the initiative over the past years in promoting the FMCT treaty. A few nations are very reluctant to sign up to it, but we must start negotiations as soon as possible. Third, the first committee of the UN General Assembly will be held this autumn. Since the mission to gain a commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals at the NPT Review Conference is complete, we now need to explore a new resolution that would help further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Fourth, Japan should seize every opportunity to urge both the United States and Russia to accelerate START negotiations, while calling on other nuclear-weapon states to make independent efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Serious consideration should be made of the effects NMD would have on Japan's security.

Noboru is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Conference on Disarmament.



Japan's Proposals Too Modest

Hiromichi Umebayashi

In the context of the role played by Japan, the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference turned out as I had expected. Conversations with Foreign Ministry officials before the conference gave me a reliable yardstick with which to measure the Japanese government's approach to nuclear disarmament against that of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). During negotiations, I realized that the Japanese government opposed the skepticism of NAC toward the nuclear-weapon states, and that in this respect, it believed that the NAC's approach was inappropriate.

When we pressed the Japanese government to vote in favor of the NAC resolution tabled at the UN General Assembly last year, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official argued that the NAC had failed to get through to the nuclear-weapon states, and had been unable to follow up on the resolution. On the other hand, he said, Japan had been able to establish lines of communication with the nuclear-weapon states and to win concessions from them during such negotiations.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Japanese government made an eight-point proposal that contained what it described as stances that could realistically be supported by the nuclear-weapon states.

However, the final document has gone farther than at least two of the Japanese proposals. Goals that the Japanese government regarded as realistic turned out to be too modest. Contrary to the government's belief that the NAC would fail to influence the nuclear-weapon states, negotiations between the two parties formed the core of the final document—future steps for nuclear disarmament. It is a cause for great joy that the conference came up with a better final document, but a disgrace for Japan that it should have made such proposals in the first place.

While the NAC plans to enlist the support of international public opinion in its diplomatic efforts, Japan doggedly clings to a step-by-step approach limited to individual negotiations primarily with the United States. This explains why the Japanese government's target was so unambitious. Moreover, while the NAC appeals for the elimination of nuclear weapons for the sake of humankind, Japan subordinates this goal to its relations with the United States. Critically, Tokyo is not even aware this is the case.

Furthermore, there has been political confusion regarding the relationship between the Japan-U.S. security framework and Japan's nuclear elimination policy, with the result that political debate in Japan on disarmament is being strangled by the security alliance. The Japanese government's policy of seeking gradual decreases in the nuclear-weapon states' stockpiles—with elimination the ultimate goal—while at the same time stressing the importance to Japan's security of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is logically and morally unsound. It is necessary, therefore, to make clear that Japan will no longer depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella by accommodating the elimination of nuclear weapons within the Japan-U.S. security framework as the first step, and the Japan-U.S. security framework should eventually be replaced by a regional non-military cooperative security system.

It is important to note the "...diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" agreed at the NPT Review Conference. This agreement is a commitment made by not only nuclear-weapon states, but also by all NPT members. Japan, too, should meet its commitments in this area.

The National Defense Program Outline, which stipulates Japan's current defense policies, contains three policies related to nuclear weapons. The first is to "adhere to the three non-nuclear principles." Japan needs to restore confidence in this policy by, for example, removing the suspicion that nuclear weapons are brought into Japan. The second is to "rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrence against the threat of nuclear weapons." It will be significant internationally that Japan clearly confirms, as a first step, that nuclear deterrence applies only to "the threat of nuclear arms," and not to attacks, for example by North Korea, using biological and chemical weapons. Such extension of nuclear deterrence to threats of biological and chemical weapons contradicts moves toward a "...diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies." The third is to "play a positive role in the international effort for nuclear disarmament." Japan can play a positive role if it is able to achieve the two aims given above. I expect Diet members to make much greater efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Umebayashi is president of Peace Depot.



Civil Society Can Play Role Toward 2005

Rebecca Johnson

The outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was a great success, but the gains should not be exaggerated. The conference gives political underpinning to the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provides the non-nuclear weapon states and civil society with better tools provided they continue to employ effective strategies and tactics. But, like Article VI for much of the 1970s and 1980s, the words adopted in 2000 will mean nothing without political will and pressure.

The NPT parties gave consensus to the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," together with several practical steps in fulfillment of the 1995 pledge for systematic and progressive efforts to implement the NPT's Article VI. However, many have pointed out that the absence of a timetable is a weakness. Even attempts to give a target date to entry into force of the CTBT were thwarted. The paragraph on the fissban urged the CD to conclude the treaty within five years, but that was as far as advocates managed. It was clear that attempts to push for a timetable would have been blocked by the weapon states, so the New Agenda Coalition and others did not push it. Despite making little headway on the priority issues of CTBT and fissban, the NPT 2000 plan of action contained some important commitments, such as further reducing the role and operational status of nuclear systems, addressing (with a view to withdrawing and eliminating) tactical nuclear weapons, increasing transparency, applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, and further progress in disposing of fissile materials from dismantled warheads.

Such steps have been the core of civil society demands for many years, and NGOs worked hard with governments to get the nuclear-weapon states to agree to this more concrete programme of action. Many therefore regard the 2000 NPT document as a five-year plan, tool and lever for us to use. We will now be looking for ways to increase public attention and apply political pressure regarding each item in the plan. Two aspects of the final document are particularly noteworthy:

First, the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons provides the strongest-yet political interpretation of the Article VI obligation, and has been accepted publicly by all the NPT weapon states. Second, the practical steps are not linear, but mutually complementary and reinforcing. This represents the multistranded application of unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral measures, which need to be addressed in parallel as part of the overall process of reducing the legitimacy of and reliance on nuclear weapons. Some of these issues require more research, especially on technical and verification aspects. Civil society has the resources to help, even to initiate and lead, such studies.

Of course, many NGOs would like the nuclear powers to get talks underway, leading to a convention on the abolition of nuclear weapons. But there is plenty of material in the adopted plan to keep the N-5 productively occupied for the next five years while the political, technical and international conditions are made ready for the non-nuclear weapon states to demand consideration of a global prohibition and elimination regime.

Politics shaped the 2000 outcome, including the ghost at the wedding—national missile defense (NMD). International and economic relations, and particularly the fate of NMD in light of the U.S. elections, together with changing relations among the major powers, will likely determine how much of the ambitious plan is achieved between now and 2005. Each step in the plan needs a specialized strategy for implementation and a public campaign to create the necessary political will to make it happen. That is the task before us.

Johnson is the executive director of the Acronym Institute.



U.S. Must Place Trust in Multilateral Approach

Cathleen Fisher

The chances of implementing the undertakings made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference will depend on the outcome of three larger debates that frame consideration of U.S. policies.

The first debate concerns the role of nuclear weapons in national policy and in international security, and the relationship between nuclear deterrence and defense. The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty, for example, reflects the steadfast belief of some that the United States must retain the means of preserving, or even enhancing, its nuclear arsenal against future, unknown threats. And while many factors are driving the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program, enthusiasts of missile defenses point to the inadequacy of deterrence to counter regional missile threats as justification for NMD.

The problem is that NMD proponents want to deploy a system whose benefits are uncertain at best and whose costs and risks are both sizeable and evident. The next administration, whether Republican or Democrat, is likely to review the current plans for NMD, but the debate in the United States now appears to be about *how and when, not whether*, to build NMD. A move by the United States to deploy NMD unilaterally, and to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, could have profoundly negative consequences for a broad range of arms control and disarmament efforts.

Allied nations and nongovernmental organizations who might wish to avert the deployment of NMD must engage in the broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons and the role of defenses in the future international security environment. Any debate about the role of nuclear weapons in national policy must include discussion of extended deterrence. And this debate must take on the issue of missile defenses. Difficult questions like "Is the technology ripe?" and "Are American threat assessments accurate?" can and should be asked.

The second debate concerns the future of arms control and disarmament in the 21st century. The question is whether the current tools and institutions of arms control and disarmament can be effective in a world of multiple and multiplying nuclear powers. There are many in the United States who express great skepticism about the value of arms control. Where arms control is not valued, however, there can be little concern about the potential damage to the arms control edifice from U.S. missile defense plans.

Arms control and disarmament concepts and institutions need an overhaul. The role of the New Agenda Coalition in the recent review conference is a promising example of the power of creative alignments and approaches.

The third debate concerns the value of multilateral approaches to security and of treaty-based constraints and international law as opposed to unilateral action. The preponderance of American power 10 years after the Cold War has given rise to an arrogant—and ultimately dangerous—mind-set among many American policy makers and officials. This attitude bespeaks a new unilateralism, a distrust and dislike of multilateral entanglements and international commitments that may bind American power and constrain American actions. It is based on a mistaken, but familiar, belief that nations must rely on "self-help" if they are to survive and protect their peoples and interests.

American policy makers and the U.S. Congress in particular need to be reminded that unilateralism is a false alternative. The most profound threats to U.S. security and to the security of all nations can no longer be countered effectively through "self-help." The spread of disease, environmental degradation, ethnic conflicts that transcend artificially designated national borders require—indeed demand—the cooperation of many. Nowhere is this truer than with regard to efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons or to reduce the chances that these weapons will ever be used again.

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HPI Research Project on New Interventionism — Aims and Methods

By Nobumasa Akiyama

The Hiroshima Peace Institute launched the "Research Project on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New Interventionism," related to the third research theme of HPI. The members of the project are listed on page 5.

The project's objective is to conduct a multidimensional evaluation of intervention in domestic conflicts by international society, the source of much debate since the end of the Cold War. The examination will be based on two notions: legitimacy and rationality. The logic used to justify the behavior of various actors in international society in time of conflict is to be analyzed from the point of view of moral, legal and political legitimacy, as well as the rationality of policy decisions, such as target-setting, objectives, methods, and the timing of intervention.

Although I will leave the precise definition of new interventionism to future studies, this research project is so named to facilitate a comprehensive investigation that brings together the many actors involved in conflict resolution.

In recent years, a more diverse collection of members of international society has intervened in domestic conflicts and their resolution in the name of humanitarianism. Such activities include not only military intervention in the form of UN peacekeeping operations and multinational forces, but also aid and rescue operations by NGOs and international organizations. The media has also expanded its role to include agenda setting.

This type of analysis is necessary given that any intervention in conflicts by international society cannot be properly evaluated without focusing on the diversity of the actors themselves—who affect the character, significance, development and termination of modern conflicts—or without analyzing their characteristics and behavior.

The increasing presence of the media, for instance, greatly affects decision making by the interveners with regard to agenda setting and the forming of notions of justice. In addition, it is necessary to clarify, through objective and relative analyses, the impact of NGO activities, such as helping refugees and supplying food, on the overall resolution of conflicts and in terms of justice in international relations.

Humanitarian intervention can no longer be said to be a new issue, but HPI's research project aims to once more assess the validity of new interventionism by examining specific cases and comparing them with those in the past, and to discuss the contribution Japan—through its government and citizens—can make to conflict resolution.

Members of the research project met for the first time on July 27 to discuss their priorities and overall direction. At the second meeting on Sept. 8, the project leader, Toshiya Hoshino, associate professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, and fellow project member Tetsuya Yamada, research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, made presentations on the cases of Kosovo and East Timor, followed by a discussion. Akira Nakata, assistant manager in the development and cooperation division at the international department of the Japan Red Cross Society, and Kenji Isezaki, a senior minister in the Transitional Authority of East Timor, were invited to the third meeting on Oct. 13. Their respective reports are titled "Rescue Operations by the International Red Cross in Areas of Conflict" and "The Challenges and Dilemmas Facing UNTAET."

The project will release a report by the end of fiscal 2001. In addition, the latest information on the project, including the summary of discussions at regular meetings, will be shown on HPI's Website.

Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.

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The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

— Reporting Current Nuclear Policy and Denuclearization

By Kazumi Mizumoto

The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century is led by Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa of the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. It was set up in April 2000, and held its third, fourth and fifth meetings on July 7, Sept. 29, and Oct. 20.

At the third meeting, Shinichi Ogawa, chief of the first research office of the National Institute for Defense Studies, gave a presentation titled "Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control Policies in the United States."

In his speech, he outlined the nuclear deterrence policies of the United States, namely: (1) Primary deterrence based on retaliatory capabilities, (2) The nuclear umbrella, covering NATO, Japan and South Korea (extended deterrence), and (3) No nuclear attacks against non-nuclear states unless it is attacked by such states in alliance with or in cooperation with nuclear-weapon states (conditional negative security assurance).

Ogawa then explained the aims of Washington's proposed national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) programs, and the domestic debate surrounding their development and deployment.

He also discussed current nuclear arms control policies: (1) Nuclear non-proliferation policies to deal with nations suspected of developing nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and Iraq, (2) Nuclear disarmament policy, with the advancement of the Second and Third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START II and III) between the United States and Russia at its core, and (3) The revision of the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

In the second presentation, Naoki Kamimura, associate professor at the department of international studies, Hiroshima City University, discussed "Non-nuclear Policy and Alliance—The Case Studies of Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s."

First, he argued that involvement in alliances as part of national security policy restricts the promotion of non-nuclear policies, and vice versa, and touched on nuclear weapons and alliances involving the United States in the 1980s. He talked about the history of the anti-nuclear movement, which began in response to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and discussed the controversy over the loading of nuclear materials by naval vessels and their calls at Danish ports, and the promotion of the South Pacific Nuclear-weapon Free Zone.

Kamimura explained the different policies of New Zealand, which withdrew from its nuclear alliance with the United States after the passage of the 1987 Nuclear-free Act, and Australia, which continues to rely on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Behind the differences, he said, were such factors as a gap in the perception of threats to the respective countries. Based on a comparison between the stances of Australia and New Zealand, Kamimura called on Japan to conduct a wide-ranging national debate on the U.S.-Japan alliance and non-nuclear policies.

At the fourth meeting, Sadayoshi Takagawa, a former counselor at the Japanese Embassy in Brazil and director general for research at the Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities, gave a presentation titled "Non-nuclear Policy in Brazil."

He began by outlining the strategic environment in the South American country. Brazil is of strategic importance, he said, because it faces the southern Atlantic Ocean, a passageway to southern Africa for Europeans and Americans seeking rare metals, and shares borders with 10 countries.

He said Brazil had all but won the struggle with Argentina for supremacy in the region. According to Takagawa, Brazil, now a non-nuclear state, developed nuclear energy and weapons during the military regime from 1964 to 1984, adding that it developed 20%-enriched uranium in 1988. Following the transition to a civilian government in 1985, Brazil's military power was reduced and public opinion turned against nuclear energy after the nuclear accidents in Chernobyl in 1986 and Goiânia in 1987.

During the Collor administration from 1990 to 1992, Brazil began establishing a nuclear non-proliferation regime, and accepted mutual inspection and safeguards with Argentina through a joint declaration on common nuclear policy and other measures. In 1994, Brazil ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). In 1998, it ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty (CTBT) under the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Today, Brazil is promoting nuclear disarmament as a member of the New Agenda Coalition.

Takagawa said Brazil had been motivated to develop nuclear weapons by its rivalry with Argentina and its opposition to the United States. Brazil then relinquished its nuclear weapons program, he said, because of the handover of power from the military to a civilian administration, the receding threat posed by Argentina and new attempts to improve its international standing by other means.

Hirofumi Tosaki, research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, spoke about "Nuclear Weapons Control and Non-proliferation in the Middle East."

Tosaki said that Israel is believed to possess between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons, but continues to refuse to disclose this fact; that Iraq possesses great quantities of uranium and a small amount of separated plutonium, and that it is secretly developing nuclear weapons; and that Iran is suspected of attempting to develop nuclear weapons through importing nuclear reactors from China. He said that Libya had also attempted to obtain nuclear weapons, but had failed due to economic and technological factors.

Nuclear issues in the Middle East were the subject of discussion at NPT review conferences in 1995 and 2000. The final document at the most recent conference contained a commitment to promote the affiliation of non-parties, such as Israel, and to make efforts to establish a weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Tosaki said the goal of future nuclear weapon control and non-proliferation in the Middle East is "to abolish nuclear weapon capabilities in Israel and to create an environment where all countries in the region do not have to suspect each other of nuclear-related activities." He stressed the importance of advancing the Middle East peace process, resolving conflicts among Islamic nations in the Middle East, abolishing biological and chemical weapons, controlling ballistic missiles, and creating a strict verification system.

At the fifth meeting, Fumihiko Yoshida, an editorial writer at The Asahi Shimbun, talked about nuclear strategy and defensive weapons, and Mizumoto reported on nuclear policy and non-nuclear policy in Japan.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI.

Continued from Page 4

Members of the Project on New Interventionism

Toshiya Hoshino, associate professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Yukie Osa, managing director and deputy secretary general, Association for Aid and Relief

Kenji Kanasugi, senior assistant for policy coordination, foreign policy bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Hideaki Shinoda, research associate at the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University

Akiho Shibata, associate professor of international law, Okayama University

Jun Tsubouchi, assistant professor of international relations, Yamanashi University

Shuichi Habu, deputy international editor, international news department, The Yomiuri Shimbun

Tetsuya Yamada, research fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs

Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute
Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate, Hiroshima Peace Institute

Thoughts on Policy Research in Central Asia

By Nobumasa Akiyama

I visited Ashgabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, from Sept. 26 through Oct. 4 to attend the 6th SPF Issyk-Kul Forum. This conference brought together researchers and specialists in economics and regional studies from Central and East Asian countries, and Russia and the United States to discuss regional cooperation in Central Asia. The forum was sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and was hosted by the government of the Republic of Turkmenistan.

I sensed a degree of self-restraint within the arguments made by researchers from Central Asian republics, possibly as a result of implicit pressure from their respective social and political circumstances. Although I felt uneasy about exchanging opinions under such circumstances, we were able, in the end, to conduct some very useful discussions. Below is a summary.

The conference covered various aspects of regional cooperation, including the relationship between states and Islamic groups, and development strategy. Relations between Central Asian states are troubled due to the dispersion of various ethnic groups across national borders. Ethnic-minority opposition groups are sometimes supported by members of the same minority living in a different country, and neighboring countries are involved in border disputes. Rivalry also exists over regional leadership. Although confidence among states is a prerequisite for effective regional cooperation, there have been few opportunities for those states to build that confidence. The lack of confidence was also evident in discussions among researchers, who tended to emphasize the political ramifications of any statements made.

It seems that even local researchers are unable to obtain accurate information with which to analyze the current situation in Central Asia. They mistrust government statistics, and the arguments about political groups, such as Islamic anti-government organizations, rely, to some extent, on rumor, hearsay and news articles based on similarly spurious sources. As a result, a great deal of time and energy was spent at the conference defining such terms as Islamic fundamentalism and anti-government organizations. It should be noted, however, that the discussion of terminology is part of the political game of legitimization that is inevitable when confrontation between various political groups in different countries is involved.

During a discussion on the establishment of a stable political system, a local researcher brought up the establishment of civil society, a relatively novel concept in the region. Although I agreed with the thrust of her argument, I have my doubts about the propriety of such an idealistic notion in a region where nationwide governance is weak, and the reconciling of Islamic tradition and secular democratic principles elusive. A more fundamental problem in the region, it seems, is the absence of a just social system that secures democratic rights and prevents social exclusion and injustice, such as corruption among officials and an underground economy ruled by gangsters. Under those circumstances, "democratic" elections alone are insufficient to address popular grievances. Theoretically, the priority must be to step up efforts to implement a fair system of governance for the whole of each state. In reality, that will be extremely difficult.

A researcher from Turkmenistan told me privately that while he was angered by the high levels of corruption in his country and

others in the region, the situation was somewhat different to that seen in former Soviet states. Soon after independence, he told me, the Turkmenistan government had eliminated the mafia, former rulers of the black-market economy. That explains, I suppose, the popularity of Turkmenistan President Nyazov, even though his dictatorial rule led foreign observers to describe the country as the "North Korea of Central Asia." Nyazov's people appear to believe he is trying to clean up the country's political and social systems in the name of stability, and applaud his somewhat reckless policy of allocating 60 percent of income derived from sales of natural gas to public investment (according to the Central Bank of Turkmenistan).

Local researchers and policy makers are irritated by calls for the application of Western theories of market economics to develop Central Asia, citing the gap between Western economic theory and the realities of the region's economy. They often voice dissatisfaction with economic reforms based on the structural adjustment policy insisted on by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They referred to Kyrgyzstan, once considered the ideal student of participation in the global economy and a member of the World Trade Organization, which finds itself in the midst of an economic crisis despite faithfully implementing economic reforms.

The gap has also widened in terms of economic cooperation between the West and Central Asia. A banking consultant from the European Commission whom I met on the flight to Turkmenistan complained about that country's attitude toward the training of bankers. "They tend to pick up on those aspects of the overall theory that justify their behavior. They are not sincere about learning, and they do not care about unfair (banking) systems," he said. Sources at the Turkmenistan Central Bank, meanwhile, criticized the European program for failing to provide badly needed knowledge and expertise.

Nevertheless, Central Asian researchers see European integration as a model for regional economic cooperation. Given the high profile of European economic integration, it is understandable that Central Asian specialists wish to discuss the European experience. However, I believe they are grasping at quick-fix solution to their problems, and are too readily overlooking the incompatibility of Western theories with Central Asian realities.

Some in Central Asia argue that the region has lessons to learn from China, which has begun introducing market principles while retaining its socialist autocracy. But another possible role model exists for Central Asia in the form of countries in Northeast Asia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), most of which have achieved democratization and economic development via means other than World Bank and IMF-led reform, or socialism. In addition, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and other Asian countries may be more willing to initiate opportunities for intellectual exchange, thereby contributing to the further development of Central Asia.

Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.

Prospects for the Role of the UN and Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

– Reflections from the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Akita

By Masamichi Kamiya

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues was held in Akita City, Japan from Aug. 22 to 25, 2000. The disarmament conference, marking its 12th year, is held annually in Japan. This year's event was sponsored by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. It was supported by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Akita municipal government.

The timing of this year's conference was particularly significant. First, it was the last disarmament conference to be held in Japan this century. It took place prior to the UN Millennium Summit, and just after the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Lastly, it was held in Akita, a city devastated by some 12,000 bombs from more than 130 aircraft from the night of Aug. 14 through the early hours of Aug. 15, 1945—the final raid of World War II.

The conference was titled "Disarmament and the United Nations in the 21st Century: Strategy and Action." It was divided into five sub-themes: "Strategies for Peace and Security"; "New Approaches to Peace and Security in Northeast Asia"; "Eliminating Nuclear Dangers"; "Conventional Weapons"; and "Concluding Session."

The four days of discussions focused upon such issues as the role of the United Nations, regional approaches in the Asia-Pacific, the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and small arms.

This article will examine the role of the United Nations, and offer an analysis of the NPT Review Conference, recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and the national missile defense (NMD) program, all of which attracted comments at the conference.

Regarding the role of the United Nations in the 21st century, Yasushi Akashi, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, made several points. First, he said the United Nations should strive to both shape and represent international public opinion. Second, that it should coordinate international trade, investment and political affairs. Third, he said it must do more to codify norms of international behavior, and fourth, it must step up its activities in the field.

Regarding the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Tariq Rauf of the Monterey Institute in the United States struck a pessimistic note, saying he did not believe that the nuclear-weapon states were honest enough to proceed with nuclear disarmament, despite having made an unequivocal undertaking to its realization in a final document adopted by the review conference. His assessment may be right in light of the failure of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to agree "a programme of work" at its closing session on Sept. 14 this year.

On recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, Seo Hang Lee, a professor at the South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said the unprecedented inter-Korean summit meeting between South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had "opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation." However, others said it was too

early to tell whether the apparent rapprochement between the two Koreas was genuine, since the leaders' joint statement had made no specific mention of bilateral security issues.

NMD prompted several interesting exchanges. Many participants were strongly critical of the program, believing it would upset the momentum for nuclear disarmament. China and Russia were particularly antagonistic toward NMD. Benjamin Self of the Henry L. Stimson Center in the United States said, with some provocation, that if NMD could help the United States recognize the disutility of nuclear weapons and lead it to begin unilateral disarmament, then the program might indeed assist the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Self argued that since Washington is thinking about *how and when* NMD is deployed, not *whether* it is developed, the international community has no alternative but to use NMD to promote nuclear disarmament.

The conference dealt with other issues concerning nuclear weapons and small arms. In a message quoted in the conference program, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono stated: "The UN Disarmament Conference...has made great contributions to the activation of discussion about disarmament, and it has obtained high evaluation as a forum for deepening national understanding on these issues."

It is difficult to gauge just how useful this series of Japan-based annual conferences have been. But it can be said that the last twelve conferences have resulted in some advances in international disarmament efforts. Specific proposals made at previous conferences, such as a proposal to formulate the UN Register of Conventional Arms at the Kyoto conference in 1991, and initiatives to curbing the proliferation of small arms at the Nagasaki conference in 1995, illustrate this. In the same years those proposals were made, the UN General Assembly explored them and drew up specific measures.

Lastly, conferences of this kind have a profound impact on civil society. On the afternoon of the second day, six conference representatives joined 77 students from all 23 junior high schools in Akita city to discuss peace and disarmament. The representatives sat on the stage, while the students sat around the table originally reserved for the conference participants. It was the first time this type of meeting had been held at the conferences. During a question-and-answer session, the students raised honest and candid questions, demonstrating their concern for the issue of peace. They were peace messengers in the truest sense.

The involvement of local children reflected Akita's commitment to peace activities at the municipal level. At the same time, the program offered a lesson for other cities in Japan, including Hiroshima, in how to raise awareness of peace and disarmament among young people.

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

Correction

The surname of the associate professor at Hiroshima City University mentioned in "Members of the project" (Page 5, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000) should have read Naoki Kamimura. We regret the error.
Editor

DIARY

June 1, 2000 - October 31, 2000

- June 3
Ikuko Togo gives a presentation, "Struggling Between Universalism and Relativism - What U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy is Asking For," at a session titled "Sovereignty and Human Rights," at the semiannual conference of the Peace Studies Associations of Japan, at Daito Bunka University.
- June 7-9
Masamichi Kamiya attends the Sixth United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in Kanazawa, "Further Promotion of the Kanazawa Process into the 21st Century," at Kanazawa Bunka Hall, Japan, organized by the United Nations Association of Japan.
- June 9-10
Kamiya attends an international symposium, "The Role of NGOs in Conflict Prevention," at the Takanawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo, organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
- June 15
Kamiya attends the second Board of Directors Meeting of the Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.
- June 20-21
Kazumi Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.
- June 24
Mizumoto attends a workshop of the Hiroshima research group on developing countries at Hiroshima University. The event featured a lecture on the social and economic thought of Mahatma Gandhi by Kazuya Ishii, associate professor at Kagawa University.
- June 27
Akiyama attends a workshop on Caucasus sponsored by and held at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS).
- June 28
Mizumoto attends a workshop held at and organized by the Tokyo Foundation. The workshop featured a lecture on the forward presence of U.S. armed forces and the Japan-U.S. military alliance by Akihisa Nagashima, a researcher at the Tokyo Foundation.
- June 30
Mizumoto delivers a lecture, "The present situation and the problems of peace research," held at and organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Nursing Association.
- July 2-6
Akiyama acts as coordinator at the 14th Transcultural Seminar of the Association for Communication of Transcultural Study in Miyagi.
- July 3
Mizumoto attends the 131st workshop of the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University. The workshop featured a lecture on war responsibility in the postwar period in Finland by Prof. Hiroshi Momose of Hiroshima City University.
- July 4-8
Kamiya takes part in a fact-finding mission to Cambodia on the issue of small arms and light weapons, organized by the Japanese government.
- July 7
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their third meeting.
- July 12
Kamiya meets with foreign trainees from India and Pakistan belonging to the 2000 Hiroshima International Cooperation Program at the HPI.
- July 14
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA in Tokyo.
- July 17-19
Kamiya acts as an advisor at an open-ended and informal consultation regarding small arms at the United Nations in New York.
- July 18
Akiyama attends the 2nd symposium on Central Asia, sponsored by the Central Asia Research Institute, and held at the Japan National Press Club.
- July 26
Mizumoto attends the annual general meeting of a research group on reference material at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- July 27
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their first meeting.
- July 29
HPI sponsors an international symposium on nuclear disarmament in the 21st century.
- July 30
Akiyama participates in a workshop organized by the Strategic Studies Fellowship Program, sponsored by and held at RIPS.
- July 31
Mizumoto attends the "23rd Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues," held at and organized by the Tokyo Foundation. The forum featured a lecture on the U.S.-Japan military alliance in the 21st century by Kurt Campbell, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
- Aug. 4
Mizumoto and Kamiya attends an international symposium, "Expanding the Nuclear-free Umbrella," held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center, organized by The Asahi Shimbun, the Hiroshima municipal government and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.
- Aug. 5
Mizumoto reports on the latest developments in nuclear elimination at the Co-op Rainbow Gathering for Peace in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, held at Hiroshima YMCA Hall, organized by the Japanese Consumers' Co-operative Union.
- Aug. 18
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA, in Tokyo.
- Aug. 19
Akiyama acts as a coordinator at Peace Forum 2000, organized by the Hiroshima Junior Chamber.
- Aug. 19-28
Akiyama visits Washington, D.C., to conduct research into the Agreement for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Japanese and United States governments.
- Aug. 22-25
Kamiya attends the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Akita, held at the Akita Castle Hotel, organized by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.
- Aug. 28-29
Mizumoto and Akiyama attend an international workshop on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at Takanawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo, organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
- Aug. 29
Kamiya delivers a lecture on peace education to teachers and staff at Ozuka Elementary School in Hiroshima.
- Sept. 2
Mizumoto delivers a lecture, "Peace in the 21st century—The principal of the Constitution of Japan and the experience of Hiroshima," at a meeting of the Hiroshima Branch of the Japan Congress of Journalists, held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center.
- Sept. 7
Akiyama delivers a lecture, "Politics and Administration of Japan," at a general orientation for participants in a training program operated by the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
- Sept. 8
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their second meeting.
- Sept. 26-Oct. 4
Akiyama visits Ashgabat in Turkmenistan to present a report, "Social Foundations for National Reconciliation in Tajikistan: Lessons from East Asian Experiences," at the 6th SPF Issyl-Kul Forum, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
- Sept. 29
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their fourth meeting.
- Oct. 3
Mizumoto attends an international symposium, "Security and nuclear weapons in northeast Asia," at Kosai Kaikan, organized by the Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute at Tokai University.
- Oct. 5-15
Kamiya visits the UN headquarters in New York to attend an open-ended and informal consultation regarding small arms.
- Oct. 6
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA, in Tokyo.
- Oct. 7
Togo gives a presentation, "Democracy and Women's Human Rights," at the session "Gender and Politics," organized by the Japanese Political Science Association, at Nagoya University.
- Oct. 10
Mizumoto and Akiyama give keynote speeches at a workshop on Hiroshima and Japan's nuclear policy, attended by UN disarmament fellows at HPCF.
- Oct. 13
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their third meeting.
- Oct. 20
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their fifth meeting.
- Oct. 28
Mizumoto delivers a presentation, "Nuclear and Peace: The Viewpoint of Hiroshima and International Politics," at a workshop organized by the Hiroshima research group on developing countries, at Hiroshima University.

— Visitors to HPI —

- July. 20
Dr. Kimberly M. Zisk, visiting research fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo and associate professor at Columbia University, New York
- Aug. 2
Niu Qiang, deputy secretary general, and other members of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament
- Aug. 7
Dr. Marcos Antonio dos Santos Reigota, professor at the University of Sorocaba in Brazil
- Aug. 10
Dr. Gerrit W. Gong, director of the Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and Ms. Taeko Teramae, an A-bomb witness
- Sept. 26
Max Kwak, director of Kansai American Center, and Yasuo Satake, media specialist at the U.S. Consulate General
- Oct. 5
Members of the broadcasting club of Hiroshima Kokutaiji High School
- Oct. 11
Misa Fukunaga, former field officer at the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Oekusi, East Timor

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